

# THE NEW AGE

INCORPORATING "CREDIT POWER"

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## NOTES OF THE WEEK.

Viscount Rothermere contributes a long article to the *Daily Mail* of June 21 on "Hungary's Place in the Sun." It is a history of Hungary's dismemberment, and a plea for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon so as to allow her to re-absorb from Czechoslovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Roumania some two million nationals who live immediately outside her present border. He commends to the Foreign Office the example of Italy in "holding out a hand" to Hungary, and invites it to give personal attention to the attempt of Roumania to burke international arbitration on the question of her expropriation of Hungarian farmers without compensation. His general thesis is that the political condition of Central Europe is highly dangerous, and that something must be done without delay to lessen the tension. He rules out in advance all attempts to rectify Treaties by force in this area, saying that the Allied Powers—in the interests of self-preservation—would be bound to oppose any nation who, justly or unjustly, resorted to arms. There is, he points out, a better and surer way:—

"No influence is more important in Central Europe than that of the great financial houses of London and New York. They have this matter in their own hands. If they refuse to make money advances to the States which are responsible for maintaining the present precarious situation there, it will not be long before the result of that policy begins to show itself in the adoption of adjustments and understandings which will greatly reduce the potential causes of war. . . . Reasonable rectifications of frontier difficulties, carried out advisedly and calmly under this influence, will strengthen rather than endanger the peace of the world."

It will be seen that Lord Rothermere is talking realism for once. He sees that, whatever Ministers and diplomats may do, it is the banker who writes and unwrites Treaties.

This has a direct bearing on the conversations between America, Britain, and Japan with regard

to the balance of naval power. If, as Lord Rothermere sees, the banking houses of America and Britain together can enforce political policy on a small State by the use of their combined credit power, they can obviously use their credit powers separately to modify the political policy of each other. The difference is not in principle, but in quantity: it lies in a measurement of the disparity between the respective credit powers of any given nations or groups of nations. It is undoubtedly true that Anglo-American finance can force, let us say, Rumania to deliver up territory and population to Hungary, because the disparity is overwhelming. But it is equally true that American finance, in its relations with each other Great Power separately, could force them to make sacrifices essentially similar—though nothing like to the same degree, because the disparity is so much less. To apply this truth to the current situation, while America and Britain can effectively forbid Rumania to resort to arms in defence of her policy (right or wrong) America cannot go to that length with the Great Powers. But America can do something towards it. She can propose a limitation of armaments. And she is doing so.

We will return to this matter in a moment; but first let us further analyse the case of Rumania, to see how the bankers can bring her to heel. Lord Rothermere has himself indicated them. Firstly, they can refuse to lend Rumania money: secondly, they can lend money to Rumania's unfriendly neighbours—e.g., Hungary. They need not necessarily do both: either course would cause a disparity between the economic powers of the two States in favour of Hungary. Economic power includes military power. So, unless Rumania gave way promptly, she would find herself confronted by armies and equipment superior to her own. So far this is all pretty obvious. But we have to ask now why it is that nations need to borrow money. The answer in the case we are considering is

simple. Probably neither Hungary nor Rumania possesses all the physical resources necessary for a quick expansion of military power. They both need to import equipment. But supposing Rumania to have possessed unlimited resources of this kind, would such a fact have enabled her to resist a financial boycott? The answer is No. She would be just as unable to finance the assembling and manufacture of her own resources as she would be to import the manufactures of other countries. The reason is that she cannot create the large financial credits necessary to carry out armament-production of the dimensions required. Here we must define the word "she." "She," is political Rumania—speaking ideally, the Rumanian people, or practically, the Rumanian Cabinet. But this "she" is subservient to a "he"; and the Rumanian "he" is the Central Bank and banking system operating in Rumania. The Rumanian banking system owes allegiance to the international banking system. The international system, in the case under discussion, would have its embodiment in Anglo-American finance. So that in the last analysis it would be the Rumanian banking system which actually and immediately restricted the armaments of Rumania, and thus enabled the Anglo-American bankers to enforce their policy on the Rumanian Government by the process of arming Hungary, or even only making preparation to do so. It is a curious reflection that whereas a Communist discovered trying to put a single Rumanian gun out of action would be severely punished, nobody troubles about a Rumanian institution which can and will prevent whole batteries of Rumanian guns coming into existence. Of course, nobody knows that such a thing happens. But if he found out he would still not care to interfere, because the Rumanian bankers would tell him they could not help it. They would plead the "universal laws" of finance; and since workman, master, politician, Minister, and King accept these as being equal in validity to natural law, no objection would be possible. There is no answer except the answer we propound and expound with wearisome reiteration week after week in these columns.

The control of a whole involves the control of all its parts. The control of credit means the control of all economic activities, of which the military means of self-defence is a part. Therefore no nation which does not control its credit can control its military policy. That is to say that a close corollation of controllers of the world's credit could allot armaments to each several nation on a plan of its own. Or to put the case more practically, the predominant nation in an international system of credit-control can, to the degree of its predominance, ration the armaments of its trade competitors.

Now we come back to the naval conversations. America, the predominant financial nation, says, "Come, let us reason together about the ratio 5:5:3. Nobody need trouble to remember these figures, nor the kinds of armaments to which they apply. The essential points are that there is a move (1) to get a certain ratio agreed; (2) to ensure that the agreement applies over the widest possible field of military economics, so that no party to it can do anything practical to disturb the ratio without manifestly breaking the terms of the agreement."

These "conversations" are quoted in the Press as though they were spontaneous. That is eye-told that if a proper understanding is not reached, America is going to put in hand a huge programme of naval construction. The discussions therefore begin under the shadow of coercion. But the mere threat of America to build warships would be no

threat at all if Britain and Japan were able to follow suit. We must therefore suppose that they are not. At least we know this, that if they did it would be at much more inconvenience than America would suffer. It is not difficult to see why. One of the universal "laws" of credit is that there must be a roughly even ratio of gold to credit. Therefore America, holding about half the gold in the world is "legally" entitled to create half the credit in the world. Now, without being obliged to estimate the natural resources in America, we can say that they do not come to more than a fraction of those in the rest of the world. Assume some arbitrary token-figures to illustrate the consequences of this position:—

	America.	All other Countries.
Gold holdings valued in a common (sterling) unit .....	£100	£100
Legal right to create credit, say ten times	£1,000	£1,000
Internal physical resources in a common quantity unit. Say ...	1,000 units	3,000 units.
Average cost of working up each unit of physical resources. Say ...	£1	£1

These figures yield a factor which will represent what may be called a National Index of Accessibility to internal resources. This factor in the case of America would be 1, or let us say 100 per cent., because she would be legally entitled to create £1,000 credit, which is equal to the cost of working up her 1,000 units of resources. In the case of the rest of the world, the factor would be one-third, or say 33 per cent. This is to say that whereas the other countries of the world would together possess the potential power to produce goods at three times the pace of America, the law of the gold ratio would keep their actual production back at the American pace. As students of the Social Credit Theorem would say: America would be allowed financial access to the whole of her *Real Credit*, but the rest of the world only to one-third of its *Real Credit*.

What is true of general production is also true of particular production, to wit—armaments. So the above figures mean that the gold-ratio "law" permits America to build ship for ship, gun for gun, against the rest of the world; whereas, if it were not for that "law" the rest of the world could build three to America's one. As it is, the rest of the world might still "legally" outbuild America in terms of armaments, but only on a certain condition. If America, legally empowered to create 1,000 units of general production, chose to create, say, 100 units in the form of armaments and feed her population on the 900 units, this would permit the rest of the world to create, say, 300 units of armaments and live on 700 units of other production. But at once the snag in this "freedom" towers up like the Statue of Liberty: for the situation would be that the rest of the world, with a population ten times that of America, would have to live on an actually less quantity of production. This absurd result does not reflect facts as we experience them to-day, but it does truly show the logical end of the gold-ratio law if it were allowed to operate without opposition on the part of the world's industrialists, engineers, and individual consumers. The law is working on a low gear at present; but the whole point is that it works, and in the direction described. As an example in current affairs we have the recent spectacle of Vickers and Armstrong's in an awful plight through lack of orders. In other words, their "Index of Accessibility" to

the raw materials and labour power required for new armaments has been depressed to only a fraction of their potential productive powers. Excluding moral considerations, which are outside the immediate question, there is no reason at all why Britain should suffer an armament policy to be imposed on her because America threatens to go in for naval expansion. Britain's dilemma (and that of other European countries) is not a lack of economic resources, but a bankers' prohibition against her using them. Either the Gold Standard or the Union Jack will have to be hauled down.

It is significant that the renewal of naval conversations has taken place coincidentally with the sudden emergence of forces in this country threatening to break the grip of the gold-standard law. The question, too, of how the navies of the Great Powers shall be proportioned out according to a ratio is only camouflage for the wider question of how their general economic activities shall be allowed scope. The decision in the next great war will rest not so much on the respective accumulated armaments of the protagonists as on their respective national powers of quick improvisation. Of what use to Great Britain would be a preponderance of battleships at the beginning of another war if in the meantime her naval constructional equipment (e.g., Vickers' and Armstrong's plant) had become obsolete? It is true that a preponderance of the largest capital ships would be an important factor, because these take too long to construct to be replaceable during a conflict unless it is very protracted. And on this technical point it is interesting to observe that America refuses Britain's proposal to include the question of the size of capital ships in the present conversations. The proposed ratio is to apply to the smaller, and more quickly constructed, elements of naval power. The nation that will exercise most force in the next war will be that whose whole economic machinery is in the best going order. And if there is a financial law which feeds America's machinery and starves Europe's, that law is worth a whole extra navy to America, quite apart from what size of navy either can show at any time. It is therefore not surprising that Mr. McKenna is calling for an investigation of the law, and that his colleague, Mr. J. F. Darling, has been preaching the "Economic Unity of the Empire." We must add a last word. These arguments have a militaristic flavour. They seem to encourage an attitude that can only result in an unlimited expansion of armaments. But such a consequence is not inevitable. The substitution of another basis than gold for economic activity, even while it is immediately making possible a multiplication of the engines of war, is opening up the way to removing the fundamental cause of war. An expansion of credit, accompanied by a credit policy designed to distribute new production within the home market, removes the danger. As readers of THE NEW AGE know, that credit policy has been discovered, and its soundness is demonstrable to anyone who will take the trouble to investigate it.

One seldom encounters any phenomenon on which Mr. Garvin cannot write three columns of facile explanation in *The Observer*. This week he is up against a conundrum. "For some reason a spirit of inexplicable fatuity is apt to descend upon Governments in their Third Session. Mysteriously possessed by this sort of suicidal psychology, a Cabinet including able men will then be seen bringing in measure after measure to strengthen its opponents and diminish its friends. . . . We wish some Asmodeus would lift off the top of No. 10 and enable us to see and hear this Cabinet at

work. Who chiefly has induced this Cabinet to turn itself into a Suicide Club? If some Iago were amongst them persuading Mr. Baldwin's Government and the majority of the Ministerial journals to work for bringing Mr. Lloyd George back to power—though by no means risking the creation of a clear Socialist majority instead—the thing could not have been better contrived."

The answer to this, in all its aspects, has been discussed threadbare in THE NEW AGE; and, as it happens, was summarised by Major Douglas in his article last week on "The Liberal Revival." What has happened to the Conservative Government is exactly what would happen to the manager of any business concern who was forced to attempt two mutually destructive tasks. Every Government is in this position. It has to carry out the policy of High Finance, and at the same time to please the electors. The object of financial policy is to reduce individual incomes to the lowest limit, whereas the object of the elector is exactly the opposite. To the casual observer it might appear that there is an attainable compromise—some standard of income which can keep people generally satisfied while not disturbing the arrangements of the banks. But to the initiated this is known to be impossible. For reasons made clear by an analysis of the existing principles of accrediting and pricing production, there is no limit to the diminution of personal income which the banker would pronounce sufficient if there were the slightest margin for further reduction without precipitating widespread civil disorder. Now a Government has to choose a line of action. In making its choice it has to "face facts." The facts are these: that whereas (assuming it has just taken office after a General Election) it need not consult the electors for three years, it has to consult the bankers next week, and every week. Like any ordinary business concern it has to borrow credit while waiting for revenue. So, in order to function at all it has to satisfy the requirements of the credit monopoly. This situation is universal, whatever the political system, and is the reason why, as Mr. Bernard Shaw answered a critic of the Bolshevik Government who asserted that the people hated it: "The people hate every Government." The fundamental cause of political animosity against the policy of the banker. All the major political grievances arise out of the relation between incomes and prices (including taxation—the price of what people buy in the mass by proxy). A Government is the visible agent of the bankers' policy; hence it is the Government and not the bankers that the electors demand shall be changed when things go wrong. Naturally, the bankers are quite willing to oblige them. They have in stock an assortment of Prime Ministers—bankers' Ministers. If you do not like what Mr. Baldwin has done, you can have Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. But while it is electors who make the change, it is the bankers who improve the ostensible occasion. In the present case they have not overtly forced the Government to give mortal offence to Labour (The Trade Unions Bill) or to Liberalism (The Lords Reform Proposals); it is probable that the immediate cause of the Government's actions is that it has given up hope of maintaining its general popularity by acts and is reduced to the salvage process of stimulating Conservative support by gestures. Or one may reflect that possibly a majority of the Government are implicated in an arrangement to "let Lloyd George have a Parliamentary candidates are divided into three hostile Parties, at the top of the political machine there are no Parties, but one clique. But whichever theory is right, the result is that at the next election at least two dominant issues are already assured which have no relation at all to the economic grievances of the electorate. The Liberals may come back with a

mandate to un-reform the Lords Reforms or Labour to repeal the Trade Unions Act. But nothing even remotely connected with what your income is and what you have to pay for the means of life will happen as a result of either victory. In the face of this intrigue there is little enough that intelligent people can do. But duty compels them to do what they can, and that duty is at least to shut their own pockets against all appeals for contributions for political campaigns, and to dissuade as many of their friends as possible to do the same. Every Party is a Bankers' Party.

The puzzlement of Mr. Garvin, as will be guessed, has been occasioned by the terms of the Government's proposed reform of the House of Lords. On this he lays down the proposition that if the Lords are to stabilise their hereditary rights as legislators they must be content with less powers: or conversely, if they want more powers they must relinquish the hereditary principle of selection. There could not be a better example of that gastronomic exercise of swallowing the camel which so persistently characterises Democratic modes of thought. First of all the House of Lords has been superseded by the Directors of the Bank of England ever since the date when Money Bills were withdrawn from its jurisdiction. So the practical effects of the hereditary principle are *nil*, whatever its intrinsic demerits. But supposing the practical effects happened to be important in the sense that the House of Lords were able to shape legislation. What is the alternative? Presumably to replace the hereditary principle by that of election. "Let legislators be selected by merit and not by the accident of birth." Such is the froth from the democratic soap box. It entirely misconceives the main implication of the principle it attacks. If Lord Noodle begets a son we can all agree that there is no biological necessity why the baby should grow up to be a legislator like his father. But if, by reason of the hereditary principle, Lord Noodle knows that twenty-one years hence his son will become a legislator; and if the son likewise becomes aware of the fact at the age of fifteen, there are good prospects that the boy can be trained to become an efficient legislator. We suppose no one will deny that training is necessary for a legislator. So the only question is: What sort of training? (That the duration of the training should be as long as possible may be assumed to be granted.) Now it is easy to say that John Smith ought to have an equal opportunity with Lord Noodle's son of becoming a legislator: that his young Lordship should be exposed to the competing merits of John Smith—"a fair field and no favour" and all that. This would be true if the power of legislation were a sort of prize only, and not also a responsibility. Now a John Smith might be born with the same potentialities of a first-class Statesman as young Lord Noodle. But the question is which of the two would develop into such a statesman. First of all, John Smith's father, not having any idea of this high responsibility for his infant son, would not train him for it. Secondly, when young John began to feel the "call to politics" he would probably be in a job and dependent on it. Thenceforward he would divide his time between earning a living and improving his political knowledge. So far, so good. But thenceforward nearly everything he would have to do to rise in the political world would involve the exercise of arts and artifices which would distort and eventually spoil his natural potentialities for responsible statesmanship. In the meantime young Lord Noodle would not only be learning the theory of government, but probably practising it in a minor way, perhaps on a landed estate. We are not concerned with the fact that the hereditary principle

fails at present to guarantee the provision of a disinterested and judicial body of legislators (although neither does the principle of election). We are saying that, other things equal, the man who is freed from the task of fighting for his opportunity to govern has many more chances of qualifying for that responsibility than one less fortunately placed. To achieve the democrat's ideal of a "fair field," it is clear that every boy's father ought to receive the same income. This is unlikely to take place in our time: but something towards the equalisation of leisure is imminently feasible. Under a Social Credit régime not only will time be generally available for political training, but—much more important—political ambitions will be largely purified of economic motivation.

However that may be, we have to challenge the Democrats on another ground. They would eliminate heredity. From the point of view of political principle there is no essential difference between the exercise of governing power by heredity or by private nomination. It would be just as scandalous to the Democrat that Lord Noodle should be able to appoint John Smith to sit in the Upper Chamber as that his own son should sit there. But that is how the highest seats of all Government are filled to-day. This is true of Cabinets: they are virtually Houses of Lords, with the single difference that they choose beforehand what the Commons shall discuss instead of revising it afterwards. But we are not speaking of Cabinets. We are speaking of the Bank of England. It is to the Court of the Bank that Mr. Garvin should present his doctrine. "Either," he should say, "throw your Directorships open to popular election in return for your powers, or else relinquish your powers in return for your system of nomination." With all its faults, the hereditary system never gave us alien rulers.

This leads directly to another passage from Mr. Garvin's article. Describing the powers proposed on behalf of the reformed House of Lords he says:—

"As regards money-bills, the Speaker's present discretion is abolished. Instead the House of Lords is to be equally represented on a Joint Committee to decide what are money bills and what are not. In this way the influence of the hereditary principle on national finance, as well as general legislation, is markedly strengthened."

This is not so. The Joint Committee will contain a large majority of bankers' nominees. How should it not, seeing that it has to give technical advice on finance? As a matter of fact, the institution of this Committee can be much more plausibly criticised on quite a different ground, that it deprives of discretion the one official of the House who best embodies impartiality of view and courage of responsibility in making his decisions. He will be superseded by a body composed for the most part of agents of the credit monopoly, and, for the rest, of people who "always accept the view of experts."

Mr. Garvin goes on to threaten Mr. Baldwin and his colleagues that

"If they insist that their scheme to bias the Constitution for ever in the interests of one party out of three shall be carried into law without consulting the mass of the people, we shall tell them what will happen afterwards. There will be a General Election like that of 1910. The whole land question, with all its bearings on towns and transport, will be combined with the question of the House of Lords."

Mr. Garvin thus seems to attribute the new proposals to the influence of noble landowners. If he is right, their act is a natural reply to the manifestation of both Labour and Liberalism to find a scapegoat for the economic stress in which this country is placed. Both these Parties' land reforms

involve a squeeze on the landlords in the last resort. Behind these political policies stands financial policy, which seeks to subdivide large land ownership, a potential base of credit, into small ownerships and tenancies, actual bases of financial debts. Though tactically wrong the landowners are instinctively right. If the influences that have set the *Daily Mail* on their track with a land-agitation of its own, and have allowed to Mr. Lloyd George exclusive discretion in the use of his £2,000,000 of funds, get their way, landowners will have to make sacrifices, but the electors will not gain by them. There will be no sharing out of the plunder: it will go to extinguish National Debt and will thereby extinguish itself.

## The Midland Bank and a Financial Inquiry.

By C. H. Douglas.

I suppose that to anyone interested in the question, the evidence offered during the past few years of a divergence in policy between the Midland Bank and the other banks, including the Bank of England, is a matter of profound interest. Actually, the divergence is not so great as to constitute in itself a matter for congratulation on the part of the iconoclast, or for undue alarm in the Board Rooms of the orthodox. There are, however, indications that the largest single banking institution in the world has passed over what would be called in railway parlance, "a set of facing points"; razor edged at the point of contact with the main line, but inevitably swinging the train along a course increasingly divergent from the route which it has left.

The recognition of this, and an appreciation of the immense significance of action on the part of so large an institution, even though that action may seem for the moment to have small amplitude, has produced a tendency to a certain amount of unjustifiable assumption as to what may be expected from the Bank's action, and in particular, in regard to the stand taken by Mr. McKenna as its spokesman, in pressing for an inquiry into our financial and credit system.

Premising that, of course, I speak in complete ignorance of what can be passing in the mind of Mr. McKenna himself, it seems to me that a recognition of the difficulties involved in the situation might be helpful, both as assisting in the formation of public opinion on the matter, and to prevent the relaxation of effort in other directions.

It has to be recognised that this problem of the financial system has at least two aspects. As has been emphasised in this journal (perhaps, as some might say, almost to the point of wearisomeness), the financial system is a defective system, considered as an instrument for accomplishing those things which our present civilisation and our industrial organisation set out to accomplish. That, be it observed, is practically what Mr. McKenna suggests, and it is quite likely that if he could be induced to voice his opinion on the matter, he would say that that is quite enough to deal with at one time.

But, important as this aspect of the matter undoubtedly is, it is of comparatively trivial importance in relation to the wider question that our existing civilisation, and in particular, our industrial organisation is fundamentally misdirected, not merely in its mechanism but in its objectives. For instance, Mr. McKenna, and one has every sympathy with his policy, bases his criticisms on the existence of a state of bad trade and unemployment in this country, and adduces the possibility of removing, or greatly ameliorating this condition as the incentive to making changes in our banking system. But

there are many people—and the number is growing—who would contend that the proper objective of a modified financial system would be to increase unemployment and diminish trade, although, being wise, they would perhaps phrase the matter somewhat differently. But however that may be—and the matter is not one that can be disposed of in half-a-dozen paragraphs—there are certain hard facts which have to be faced in this connection, whether the ethical and psychological implications of them are tackled or not, and it might be well to recapitulate them.

The first of these is that production is a rate of flow and consumption is also a rate of flow, and that even now the rate of flow of production is greater than the rate of flow of consumption. But the matter does not end there. The possible rate of acceleration of production is immensely greater than the possible rate of acceleration of consumption, excluding for the moment the limitless consumption of war. This is quite apart from any financial consideration, such as the provision of additional purchasing power.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the best brains in the world are cumulatively employed in accelerating the rate of production per unit of human labour employed. This can be translated into easy English by saying that the best brains are endeavouring to put people out of employment. Therefore the best brains are endeavouring to defeat Mr. McKenna's good intentions as stated above, which are directed to putting people into employment.

But let us suppose that both Mr. McKenna and the best brains can be made for a time equally successful. Such a dual success can only be upon the basis of (a) an enormously increased output per unit of human labour, (b) an enormously increased amount of human labour employed. Adding together (a) and (b), we might say by accommodation that the amount of output is going to be in proportion to the square of the increment of success of Mr. McKenna and the best brains. A vision of a world covered fathoms deep with motor-cars, radios, gramophones, and other products of repetition manufacturing is bound to arise as we consider this prospect.

(To be continued.)

"The unthinking imagine that Reparations are manifestly a benefit to the recipient nation. Sometimes that is so, but often there is no greater fallacy than to assume that the recipient nation is a beneficiary in any real sense of the term. . . . The only possible way that Germany can meet the increased Reparations now about to be demanded is at the expense of producing at a correspondingly lower level than the recipient countries."—*The Statist*, February 5, 1927.

"During the past year there has been considerable criticism of the practice of instalment buying. Consumer banking credits are not credit inflation in the sense often charged, but new credits granted to the third party of the economic triangle; namely, the consumer, who never before enjoyed extensive banking credit. The automobile industry contends that consumers of good character, with established earning power, are legitimate credit risks, subject to safeguards and restrictions such as are exercised in granting credit to anybody. . . . Manufacturers, merchants and retailers realise to-day as never before that the wheels of business cannot be kept turning on a large scale without mass consumption. Mass consumption is necessary to support mass production and high wages, and mass credit is the Atlas which holds up all of them. Consumer banking is the time payment plan are here to stay."—A. R. Erskine, President of the Studebaker Corporation, quoted in *Wall Street Journal*, January 14, 1927.

"In the week ending February 19 the official employment bureau (in France) had 96,547 applications for employment that it was unable to satisfy. On November 15 there were only 459 unemployed in receipt of the dole, and offers of employment greatly exceeded the applications for it."—*Manchester Guardian*, February 26, 1927.

## The Meaning of Spirit.

By Philippe Mairet.

What is the meaning of the word "Spirit"? So many people imagine that it is synonymous with "ghost" and "spook," and signifies something which science has proved not to exist, that it is often necessary to defend this word itself, one of the most valuable concepts we possess. A doctor of medicine of a very scientific spirit, lately wrote a criticism of Eucken in which he said that "spirit" was to him a concept of no intelligible content.

"The belief in spirit, he wrote, "is a psychological delusion. It is the sublimation of an impulse which arises not in the inherited past, as instinct, but within the consciousness during our awakening from unconscious immaturity, as a subjective realisation or experience of a process of progress and advance."

There is an assumption implicit in these words which is typical of one of the worst prejudices that modern civilisation engenders. It is assumed that an impulse arising out of the inherited past can produce reality, but that immediate and direct self-experience can only produce delusions. No doubt it is quite possible and legitimate thus to divide our impulses into those which arise by instinct without our conscious will, and those which we clearly feel that we ourselves generate in our consciousness, but why should we call the one real and the other unreal? It can only be a false distinction made in order to stress one side of our experience. The scientist wishes to investigate *causes*, which he can find in the inherited past, but he cannot find the cause of consciousness because the spirit *is* cause in itself. The existence of that ever-present uncaused cause, a centre of spontaneous generation, as it were, is the most immediate and inalienable experience of human life—it is the very basis of our being and intelligence. It is only a philosophy over-fascinated by science which tries to reduce this noumenal reality to the ordinary phenomenal level, which is as impossible as the desperate efforts to dismiss it as an illusion.

Moreover, the idea expressed in the word Spirit can only be denied by making an essentially unscientific philosophy—unscientific because based on a redundant hypothesis. A scientist has to make hypotheses; but he does not need to believe in their truth, in fact he must not do so. They are working ideas, which Science takes up and lays aside like tools. But philosophy, which is concerned with the meaning of experience as a whole, must take experienced reality for truth. It cuts its own throat if it imagines something hypothetical to be more real than reality—something such as matter, or electricity, for instance. Philosophy has to reject arbitrary and remote suppositions and to base itself upon the most immediate and universal fact it can find. We are ourselves as much beings as bodies—we exist in a consciousness, and philosophy cannot assume that we are in that respect an accidental exception to the cosmos. Some things, such as stones, for instance, may superficially seem dead and quite independent of subjectivity; but no one would deny that an animal is the vehicle of some kind of inner life; and life does evidently shade off through imperceptible gradations through the animal and vegetable kingdoms into the mineral itself. We must call some things "dead" for convenience, but the more we examine them the less absolutely dead they appear. If there is some point in the scale of creation beyond which there are bodies utterly devoid of psychic being, no one has determined it; and as an assumption the idea has no value—not even to the scientist.

There is a tendency, especially in recent times, to found philosophies upon such valueless hypotheses. Out-and-out materialism imagined a universe of "dead" particles combining by the action of equally "dead" forces: and lately we have had philosophies of a more psychological sort of determinism, hypothecating "blind" instinct of various kinds, or "life-force" as the all-determining reality. It is necessary, therefore, to enquire into the motive behind all that kind of theorising. Just as the scientist's hypothesis is an instrument he uses for work, a man's philosophy is the instrument he uses for the kind of life he wants to live. So, if men begin to prefer the idea that the supreme causal principle is something dead or blind or in any case a power, not ourselves, making for something or other which we don't know, it is safe to assume that we live in an age when men want to escape complicity in the universe somehow. We want a philosophy of helplessness. Or it may be that we are deeply afraid of humanity, and want to take away its spirit by denying the reality of Spirit. All are prone to this kind of thinking at times, though few are able to give it any expert philosophical form: but it is by turning our back upon our most immediate experience: it diverts us from the everyday intuitive certainty we have that we are each a part of life, and effectively working and shaping it by our spiritual powers of will and ideation. That immediate sense that we are men, the most clearly focussed—and therefore the most effective and individualised spirits in the whole of our experience—is really stronger than any hypothetical and imaginary theories of something else; for we live in it and by it: but nevertheless it can be gradually weakened and worn away by doubtful thinking. People in the modern world are made more and more to feel that they are the consequences of some unknown thing, which Science will one day perhaps discover. Flying to opposite extremes, such as Christian Science and Spiritualism, is not the worst of the effects of this: it leads to neurosis, which is pre-eminently a disease of subjective uncertainty or doubt.

Unfortunately a great part of the work done to treat and cure neurosis is associated with philosophical *suggestion* that is likely, in wider circles, to increase it. Conceptions such as Libido and Collective Unconscious, given to a world already using big abstractions to sustain a perverse line of life, are all too likely to be taken for a new revelation of cosmic powers, destroying the last vestiges of human autonomy. One can only admire the consummate artfulness of Adler, in his carefulness not to give people any such dangerous ideas. An idea is a formidable tool, whose value depends entirely upon what you want to do with it. Thus Adler gives out, to all and sundry, but one focusing concept, and it is not even an idea of a reality, but of a particular kind of illusion—the *sense* of inferiority, not even actual inferiority. He is careful not to project another generalisation which could serve as both a discouragement and an excuse. His diagnosis, also, is always a method of relating everything causally to the individual himself—to his own "way of life."

That is psychology, and not philosophy. But the value of the individual in psychology is the same as that of Spirit in philosophy. Spirit is fundamental, it is more than a priori. If it be denied, the individual loses his distinctiveness and meaning, and community also becomes impossible. Human community cannot be founded upon abstractions, nor upon any generalisations we can make about oversouls, instincts, or inherited similarities. Its basis is an immediate activity of the Spirit; and in the last resort both Individual and Society derive their being from our implicit faith that Spirit is real.

## Views and Reviews.

THE I. Q.

Since 1918, when the whole American Army was subjected to psychological tests for the measurement of intelligence, America—and through America, Europe—has been threatened by a revolution in educational ideals probably as far-reaching as the political revolution in Russia. The implications of intelligence-tests which at present hold the field in America, and which were reflected in "The Future of Education" (by Mr. Pink) in England point to the possibility of deliberately selecting leader-men and geniuses. Beyond this, the idea hardens that once the future great men have been anointed for special and appropriate training the rest may justly be left to provide communities with their necessary lower castes of unskilled morons, on whose education the State need expend no more time and money than their subordinate functions require. Mankind will be saved, in accordance with the science of Galton and the philosophy of Nietzsche, by the conscious choice of ruler-men.

The result envisaged appears to sacrifice the humaner ideals on which modern communities have been built—the equality of man, the rights of man, life more abundant for all, and many other democratic inspirations. At first sight the prospect seems one of an aristocracy in which merit—even though merit be also hereditary—will be the decisive factor in elevation to positions of social privilege and responsibility. Looked at longer, however, the prospect is less attractive. Ability has come to be valued so much higher than character that character has suffered neglect, and any effort to make a permanent governing code out of what are, all said and done, ability tests only is suspect in essence from the beginning. Any future aristocracy must merit—in character whether in ability or not, since only character cannot be bought—its rank among a people the whole of whom are trained and cultured. It is more than likely that the great men worth producing would arise under the ideal of "levelling-up," which involves hard-work, duties, and sacrifices, rather than under the idea that pigmies are not socially offensive if a few are taller.

At a time when some hundreds of the gifted have been chosen from California's quarter of a million school-children for special training and observation while they bud into genius it is refreshing to meet an American professor\* who challenges both the reading of the facts and the implications generally attached to intelligence question statistics. Professor Bagley wisely acknowledges that he is not disinterested, that he holds a brief for "the common-man" to whom and from whom he wants the maximum social benefit. Nevertheless, his sight is not blurred by his object. His reading of the available data renders much of the contrast and their caste implications superficial by measure native power, no matter how careful the attempt to cancel out the contribution of acquired training and experience, has been much exaggerated, and the English caution with regard to the tests has been justified. Dr. Cyril Burt, in what Professor Bagley describes as "the only thorough-going attempt to determine what schooling contributes to intelligence as measured by tests," found that to the complete score of adolescent London children put through the Binet tests native intelligence contributed 33 per cent.; general experi-

\* Determinism in Education. By William C. Bagley. (Warwick and York, Baltimore. \$2.20.)

ence or the informal education of everyday life 11 per cent.; and formal schooling 54 per cent.

In the examination of the American Army two series of tests were given, the Alpha series designed for men who could read and write English, and the Beta series for those who could not. In 1922 Mr. H. B. Alexander showed that if the men who took the Alpha tests were sorted according to their States of origin, a very high correlation would be found between the order of resultant groups in intelligence and the order of the same States in school facilities. Professor Bagley goes further, and demonstrates that apparent exceptions to this order can be accounted for by the immigration statistics, strengthening Alexander's conclusion that the questions were rather "tests of what has been, rather than of what can be, learned." When the literate negroes who took the Alpha tests are similarly considered the intelligence rank of their States of origin shows an even closer correlation with the quality of the schools in those States, a fact which goes a long way towards answering the argument that the States with the best stock naturally had the best schools. This argument is dealt with by Professor Bagley in some detail, and his contention that where there are good schools unfavourable immigrant stock is quickly improved in such a way as to maintain the precedence of the States concerned is validated. Even in the case of the Beta tests for the illiterate—who included immigrants educated in some language other than English as well as native American illiterates—the correlation of the examination result and such schooling as the men concerned had had was .67, unity being absolute.

Professor Bagley includes in his series of essays a reply to Professor Brigham's well-known work, "A Study of American Intelligence," the primary theme of which was the superiority of the Nordic races and its implications for immigration. Once again Bagley shows that the closest correlation is to be found between the quality of the immigrant and education facilities in the country of origin, and that unsurmountable contradictions oppose the adoption of the racial theory:—

"While no one can seriously doubt the general superiority of the whites over the negroes in native intelligence, the Army tests show clearly the tremendous influence of good schools in stimulating intelligence and the corresponding handicap imposed by poor schools. On pages 724-25 of the Army report are tables that distribute by States the scores made by literate negroes on Army Alpha. . . . One finds that the literate negroes from Illinois not only surpassed the literate negroes from the South, but also achieved a median score above the median scores of the literate whites from nine Southern States; that the literate negroes from Pennsylvania surpassed the literate whites from two Southern States; while for all Northern negroes reported the median Alpha score surpasses the median Alpha score for the whites of Mississippi, Kentucky, and Arkansas."

As Professor Bagley remarks, according to Professor Brigham's method of determining Nordicism, the Southern Whites represent about the purest Nordic stock in the country, yet where their schools are poor their intelligence is low, so that Professor Brigham is compelled to choose between granting that schooling affected the intelligence ratings, or abandoning the theory of Nordic supremacy.

This work is not an attempt to discredit the system and method of intelligence tests as a whole or to bring about their abolition. Professor Bagley asks for circumspection as regards what the tests are capable of doing, and for the avoidance of a premature revolution calculated to destroy the chances of getting the best for himself and his fellows from even the child least endowed by nature. He is in agree-

ment with Professors Chambers and Reed—and fundamentally in disagreement with the influential movement grouped around Professor Terman—as to the effect of education in increasing or decreasing natural differences. That it increases the differences, and hence repays itself only in the case of the gifted, is a partial view leading to wrong conduct. Recent observation even hints that, although the child with high endowments by nature learns more quickly, the less fortunate child gradually overtakes him. It is rare for a child to possess the virtues of both the hare and the tortoise. The clever child scarcely needs education. He discovers the means of developing himself, and would succeed in any school. For teaching to be an art it must bring practical sense and wisdom into the creatures that Nature has neglected. In any event, there is no gulf between the ranks of the educated, no matter how much their original differences have been increased by training, so wide as that which divides the educated from the uneducated.

(To be concluded.) R. M.

## The Tree of Life.

By J. R. Donald (Vicar of Bradwell).

### VI.—CATHOLICISM.

TAPLEY: What's this newspaper cutting I found in the first volume of Baring Gould's "Origin and Development of Religious Belief" that you lent me? I suppose you got it from some Protestant rag, but I didn't know you patronised one. It's this kind of thing that puts me off religion. Listen to it: "In the most accurate of modern dictionaries, religion is defined as the human recognition of a super-human controlling power, and especially of a personal God entitled to obedience." I might go to a Catholic padre for theology, or even to a good Catholic paper, but I'm not going to look for it in a dictionary. And any paper that does that kind of thing, so far as I'm concerned, has little religion and no Catholicism. Here, Padre, take it. It will help to light your fire.

PADRE: This bit is it? Yes, I remember its coming out. It was a criticism on the "My Religion" articles in the *Daily Express*. But the Editor wouldn't thank you for calling his paper a Protestant rag. He talks Catholicism from one end of it to the other, and the paper is the soundest we have in the Church of England. But I suppose they're all tarred with the same brush. So you've read Baring Gould's book, Sykes? How do you take it?

SYKES: A great book by a great man, who wrote about too many things. Had he kept to one, he'd have taught us all something, as he has done even now. A pioneer book on a new line, and crude as all such, I suppose, must be, but great in spite of that.

PADRE: I wish we had more biology in the Church, for biology is the final Gamaliel test of truth. What is "of God" will live, and so will become a subject for biology, and what isn't won't. Isn't that so, Sykes?

SYKES: What can survive does survive, and what can't doesn't. But in either case the success or failure is biological, and must be accounted for biologically.

TAPLEY: I want to hear you do that so that I can see if you are any better than the dictionary on what, at bottom, religion is.

SYKES: I suppose, especially at the 'Varsity, we get the idea that a good many strange things have done, and are doing, duty as religion, and in such a view we are supported by the wars of the sects, and by the cock and bull stories of missionaries. Complete acceptance of the position might well land in atheism. Personally, I don't think there's much truth in it. Its apparent truth comes from a study of the question from the wrong angle. Never-

theless, we should be prepared for the suggestion that there is religion and trimmings. My own view is that the trimmings are, as a rule, very natural developments and manifestations. Still, we are prepared, as you evidently are, for the question: what is the vital thing in it? I don't believe in dictionaries any more than you do. I prefer to set out on my own, and to define religion of any value, as man's relation, individually and socially, to the Phylum Urge. With apologies to the Padre, I'm convinced there's very little vital religion outside that.

PADRE: I'm not inclined to disagree with that definition, for it embraces Immanentism, and we know how the Transcendental rises out of that—if you like, as trimmings. But what about Orthodoxy?

TAPLEY: You're in a sad dilemma now, Padre. You dethroned the Pope at the Reformation, and now you go to people like Sykes for the "infallible dictum." Scientific authorities are all setting up as little Popes, each in his own line, and even in religion. I would almost prefer the old arrangement.

PADRE: Don't scoff too soon. Let us at least hear what Sykes has to say, for biology is pretty conclusive. Now, Sykes, how do we stand biologically? This is a serious matter as regards Orthodoxy and Heresy, Catholicism and Protestantism.

SYKES: The whole question is clear as noonday. Religion is a biological product in human life, a biological acquisition, just as that of a rhinoceros is his horn. If the horn has what we call "survival value," the rhinoceros and his descendants survive, the horn with them. The religion that makes survival health for man—chiefly moral health—keeps homes together, helps men and children to survive, and lives on in them. That's how Orthodoxy and Catholicism came to be. They have survival value and live in the men they give life to. They are the salt of the earth, and preserve mankind. The heresies and sectaries are the beliefs and professors of them, whose survival value was inferior. The Gamaliel test has shown them up. Orthodoxy and Catholicism are less matters of logic than of history, on the anvil of which they have been hammered into their present shape. Catholicism is the vital faith and worship of the living people. Protestantism is always showing its pandering to moral attitudes more for their convenience than for their vitality.

TAPLEY: Then religion, with you, is far from being primarily an intellectual matter.

SYKES: It is. And that's where my definition comes in. Man's relation, individually and socially, to the Phylum Urge. You've got to be "rooted and grounded in love" before you can "comprehend with all saints, the length and the breadth, the height and the depth of the love of Christ which passeth" all mere brain "knowledge." Intellectual religion isn't religion at all. The only thing worthy of the name is the vital core of the Phylum Urge.

TAPLEY: I see where you get the Protestant. Too strong on intellect. Hangs his so-called religion on the wrong peg. He is in the same boat, of course, as the Modernist.

SYKES: Protestants and Modernists are both out for rationalisation, which is as foolish in religion as in all other human affairs. They look for religion where there is none, for the great Libido, the Phylum Urge, is not in their purview.

TAPLEY: From what I can see of these gentlemen, they have thrown away their religion, while carefully retaining their superstitions. Anything I ever feel I want in religion remains in the Mother Church, and ever will remain there, even when these people have left it, and carried their brain-begotten theories with them.

PADRE: I think you might be a Churchman, Tapley, if to be such didn't happen to involve being

a Christian, which I don't suppose you ever will be. The utmost I hope for you, and I do hope that much, is a sympathetic understanding of our position.

## Music.

"Aida": Covent Garden, June 8.

This was a moderately good performance of "Aida" with admirable work by some of the principal singers. Grete Stückgold was interesting and *simpatica* as Aida, and in the beautiful Nile scene sang very finely. The voice has not the heroic dimensions of those of the great dramatic soprani, but it is well schooled, of charming quality, controlled by a lively and sensitive musical intelligence. Olczewska as Amneris sang superbly, as finely as ever I remember to have heard anyone in this part, hardly excepting the great days of the Caruso—Destinn—Kirkby Lunn performances. But singularly enough, she has not the majestic grandeur and imperiousness of bearing that made Kirkby Lunn's conception so superlatively great. One missed the magnificently regal boredom and ennui of the latter in the opening of the second act, but Mme. Olczewska was superb in the great scene of Act IV., and deserved all the enthusiastic and indefinitely repeated recalls she won. A curious defect in the last scene—instead of bowing herself in prostrate grief over the stone in the temple floor, beneath which Radames has been entombed, she merely stood before it facing the audience; an error in judgment one is reluctant to lay at the door of so exacting and meticulous an artist. Herr Schipper was a magnificent Amonasro, powerful and savage, without ever becoming rough and coarse, his singing was entirely admirable, a splendid artist. Alexander Kipnis is a good singer, but lacks the imposing breadth and weight to make the High Priest convincing as Journet used to do. From these four non-Italian singers to the remaining Italian principals, was a desolating drop which underlines every word about the degeneracy of Italian singers and singing on which Mr. Newman has been laying so much stress of late. All one can say of them is that they were typical present-day Italian singers, and leave it (and them) at that. The small but important "off" part of the Priestess could hardly have been worse sung—an English singer this—than on this occasion.

Frida Kindler and John Goss (Wigmore, June 9.)

It is a matter of acute regret to the few of us who have been privileged to hear Mme. Kindler that this very fine artist, who is in the front rank of women pianists, is to be heard so rarely. She has all the superb command and the powerful intellectuality which distinguishes the greatest of the Busoni School above other pianists. Here is no flabby languishing and wholly damnable feminine "grace" and "charm," but the distinguished force and power of a fine mind and vigorous individuality. I rarely remember having been so interested in a performance of the *Wanderer* Fantasie. Her great powers had fuller scope in the immensely diversified problems, both musical and intellectual, of her husband's Bernard van Dieren's remarkable *Theme and Variations*—a composition which has the fine quality of delicate wrought metal work. A theme of great beauty is spun through one of the finest extant set of variations so personal, so individual, so admirable in their aloofness from the jargon of the day, music such as van Dieren himself almost alone knows to-day how to write. The Seven Songs to poems of W. S. Loundor I prefer to hear again before speaking about them. At a first hearing one found "The Touch of Love" and "Leaf after Leaf" the most beautiful. Mr. Goss sang better than I have heard him do for many years.

KAIKHOSRU SORABJI.

## The Theatre and Drama.

I.

The connection between the theatre and architecture does not end when the building of the stage and auditorium is completed. There is a close social resemblance in that the production of stage pieces, like the construction of buildings, requires the submission of the wills of many men for the realisation of the idea of one, and the sacrifice of their labour and time. There are, of course, a number of important differences. Once a building is put up there it is until it crumbles, or is pulled down, or is removed by artillery or earthquake; whereas a play may continue manifest only by reproduction. When demand ceases, so does reproduction. Fashion, therefore, dominates the theatre as it cannot dominate architecture, so that the theatre reflects more quickly changes in the manners and modes of thought of a community. So many wills have to be consulted—as though it were necessary to protect the wills to be submitted from futurity—before a play is produced or a building constructed, that the faults of any particular play, as also the faults of any particular building, cannot be blamed on any one person.

It is rare for anyone to blame an architect for a new ugly public or private building; it is even more rare for anyone to blame the contractor who undertakes the erection. The blame may possibly be laid on the persons who choose and pay for the design and construction, but it seems as a rule to be debited to the general trend of the community at the time. To allocate the criminal responsibility for Bush House one has to write the history of the world and America. Not to be able to hold responsible any particular person results generally in everybody escaping conviction, though nobody quite escapes the consequences, either utilitarian or aesthetic. The population of London, in other words, must live with Bush House in their midst, influencing by suggestion themselves and their progeny, until they take a responsibility more serious than that required to sanction its construction—namely, that required to sanction its demolition. For the final responsibility for team works such as plays and buildings must be borne by the community, difficult as it is to convict.

To blame a theatre manager for a play is common enough, though his position is far more hazardous than that of the person who accepts a design for a building. One theatre in London has dedicated itself to art; the Old Vic stands or falls by its faith in the drawing power of Shakespeare. Yet, although it is a very large theatre indeed, and has a pre-emptive right to the repertoire of the most highly reputed dramatist in the world, the Old Vic has to pay for its high thinking by very plain living. At West End prices it could not obtain an audience; at present prices its fate is to produce art in return for no circuses and little bread. It is not hampered by the competitive prices that have to be paid as rent for the West End theatres; it is practically unhampered financially by the drag of the star system. Indeed, the West End manager—who is in a sense the headquarters of English Drama—so far from being free to engage in the selection and production of dramatic art, is threatened with engulfment in a whirlpool of commercial conditions.

From the manager's standpoint the theatre, besides being an institution reflecting dramatic culture, is a concern that he and a staff must get a living from. No matter how loyal he may be to the drama, he cannot undertake what he does not feel reasonably sure audiences will pay to see. In providing what he believes the public ought to want, he can lose his fortune—if he has one—only once, after which he becomes the man who backed a loser. The number of the public who will visit a work of art is limited. Though

such a work may gain a relative success at this or that theatre, both might fail if two were presented together, the limited artistic public being cursed with an exceedingly limited pocket. A work of art exacts that the witness *earn* the new experience. He is required to stand at full height, and to work in order to receive what the artist offers. Art may be long, but it is rare, and many fortunes have been lost in trying to depend on it. Not even Shaw, presented at reasonable prices, would be certain to make a living for a repertoire company in London. The Irish Players must have a change from Sean O'Casey, Synge, and Lennox Robinson, and only the variety of their repertoire generally, and their power to fall back on a favourite when the red light appears, keeps them going.

As long as theatre rents are excessive, and the public regards the actor as more important than the play, the present state of affairs of high prices, popular plays, and the star system, will force its maintenance on the theatre manager. While recouping one's self for an enormous outlay remains a gamble, the practical theatre manager must be moved to invite the support of the *majority*, and of the *wealthy*, with neither of which culture finds a welcome. The theatre cannot—it never could—be restricted to a medium for culture. No man can live on the mountain all the time. It is reprehensible, but not the fault of theatre managers or of any particular class connected with the theatre, that it has to be given over to entertainment more than to art. It may be heroic for the artist to starve at his art rather than write a pot-boiler, but desire for revenge tends to add itself to necessity as a rule for the manufacture of the pot-boiler.

At the present time the theatre, besides being to a small extent a vehicle for art, and to a large extent a place of entertainment—like a music-hall, but more continuous, and therefore better—it is also to a large extent a branch of medicine. It is a department of psycho-therapy whose office resembles that of Couéism or psycho-analysis; to make people who are rightly disgusted with their period, neighbours, wives, and prospects, able to tolerate them. Men escape from business worry by various devices; they dance, drink, or sleep, read novels, or daydream, indulge in golf or tennis, or seize any available escape from thought. In each there may be some possibility of health, less in dance than in drink, less in drink than in sleep; and in each also is the possibility of merely giving way further to the disease. The man who most requires sleep may be unable to sleep, so he reads a novel, preferably a variation on a fairy-tale, so that ultimately, instead of dreaming while he sleeps, he manages to sleep while he dreams.

There is very little on the West End stage at present for which either the author or manager would claim the title of art. "The Dybbuk," at the Royalty Theatre, certainly comes within the category, while "The Beaux' Stratagem," at the Hammersmith Lyric, puts in a claim. Mr. Miles Malleon's "Fanatics," now at the Queen's Theatre, stimulates thought unto argument as propaganda, but that, rather than art, is what the author was making. Mr. Malleon is bent on giving father a whacking. Of entertainment there is a fair amount of first-class quality, including the detective plays and several farces. Of psychological medicine there has lately been a dearth. This brand of play is precisely what managers have refused in the belief that the public much preferred the stimulant—served as entertainment—which, if it made the distraught more ill eventually, at least gave them the illusion of health in artificial hyper-aesthesia for the time being. Managers have laughed at the play that really does operate as medicine, and laughed harder at the quantity of syrup mixed with

it in many cases to make it palatable. The success of two such pieces within a fortnight gives the hint that reaction is setting in against the superficiality, smart sayings, and cynicism called brilliant comedy; that ridicule of the basic institutions of society cannot stimulate for ever; and that theatrical re-education seems to begin by first returning the public to childhood or adolescence.

A. NEWSOME.

## Reviews.

**The Russian Revolution.** By Lancelot Lawton. (Macmillan. 21s.)

The extremely interesting madhouse which is the Russia of to-day is a subject which ought to be tackled by contemporary foreign writers, who can go and see it as it is, and get the vivid truth which always strikes the eye of the outsider while he is still fresh to entirely new surroundings and responsive to their radiation upon him. But yet, since frankly the Bolsheviki are out to create a way of living which is alien to anything yet known in the world, and for the achievement of which they are willing to wait until all obstacles, including human bodies, have been cleared out of the road, it may be that the first satisfactory purview of the Communist State in being is not to be had for a long time yet. Mr. Lawton, who is very careful, very painstaking, and surprisingly effective in the sum of his analysis, rather spoils his book by introducing what he takes to be an illustration of Bolshevism in the past in China, and another in Egypt. These earnest and well-intended comparisons will not quite do. The Bolsheviki are handling a bigger job precisely because, while they can deal at such grim ease with any opposition in the towns, they know they can never impose on the Russian peasant any form of Communism which does not fit in with his personal views, with his greed, his sloth, his patience and barbaric good-humour, and his essential conservatism. When Mr. Lawton tells us that Terror stalks at every corner in the cities of Bolshevik Russia, we can believe him. When he explains the honesty and sincerity of Lenin and other leaders of the new dispensation, we also believe him. "I can't stick it," said an American friend with whom he was making a tour of the night life in Leningrad. "I don't like to see unhappy people enjoying themselves." Well, that's one side of Russia. The other side is the countryside, not unchanged, for it has found a freedom no Tsar would ever have conceded, but surely, so far as Communist idealism is concerned, no different in essentials from what it was. This is, in short, as fine a book as any man could have written on an enthralling subject. If there are a few dull pages—but really, there aren't any worth mentioning. . . . !

**The Wall of Glass.** By Amabel Williams Ellis. (Cape. 7s. 6d.)

Of such excellent quality is Mrs. Williams Ellis's political novel, so fine in texture, so shrewd in observation, so sustained in its interest, that we must find a fault somewhere, and we accordingly indict her for not centralising her plot sufficiently. Would that we had as little fault to find in half the novels that we fearfully, tearfully, uncheerfully inspect. She has written a story of interesting people, and in her estimate of Tory complacency or Labour instabilities she is all for understanding and just appreciation. True, her book is a sketch, but it is a lively, true, sympathetic sketch of what she herself has seen, and in the character of the Clydesider Troake alone she shows the broad artistic comprehension and instinctive sense of proportion which mark her as a novelist whose work is entitled to high rank.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

### SCULPTURE.

Dear Sir,—To your issue of July 1, last year, I had the pleasure of contributing a short note—"The Form of Sculpture." In connection with what I then wrote I should like to draw the attention of your readers to the work of a young sculptor, Mr. Maurice Lambert, although his first exhibition (at the Claridge Gallery, Brook Street, W.) closes on June 30 next.

So rare a quality of imaginative alertness is revealed in "Kneeling Torso," a beautiful piece of craftsmanship in polished alabaster, which appeals to the combined senses of sight and touch, that it is to be hoped circumstances will enable the artist to develop the talent shown in such a piece, and in the delightful brass "Birds" on a marble base.

Mr. Lambert's portraits, notably "Peter Quennell," in bronze, are quietly well done; but it is his eagerness to adventure into unexplored fields of shape that should evoke the enthusiastic encouragement of those who appreciate vital sculpture.

ERNEST H. R. COLLINGS.

**MR. A. B. FLETCHER ON "THE FUTURE."**

Sir,—May I point out to Mr. Fletcher that it is Nature herself, or the Laws of the Universe, which created "the world of conscious future existence," which he sees as nothing but a mirage of *fin de siècle* weariness. There never was an age in which the evidence concerning strange visitants from that world was not abundant, and now that they have been brought within the ambit of experimental science the possibility of their existence, however startling it may appear to us, cannot any longer be referred to in terms of Huxleyan superiority.

ISABEL KINGSLEY.

**MR. PENTY AND DISTRIBUTISM.**

Sir,—My attention has been directed through an article in *G.K.'s Weekly* on a review of Mr. Chesterton's "Outline of Society" by Mr. Hilderic Cousens to a reference to myself to which I take exception. That reference identifies me with the social philosophy of Messrs. Chesterton and Belloc. Doubtless I share many opinions with Mr. Chesterton and a few with Mr. Belloc, as doubtless many of your readers also do. Yet finally I am no more in their boat than I am in that of Mr. Cousens.

Her little green-eyed Elsie of the suburban backstreets is a confident and vivid creation, and if the other women in the book do not appeal to us so generously, it is because the author did not spend on them the same care and concentration, or at least was not so deeply interested in them. There are many forces in the Labour movement of to-day, different in origin, in character, in motive power and intent. But only a fool would try to make out that Labour has no future because it lacks a single direction. Far more sensible is this observer, who traces each stream of power to its source, and estimates in the light of that knowledge its immediate and prospective potentialities. Of course, a political novel of to-day, if it is to be at once interesting to the general reader and true to actual contemporary life, is the devil of a job, compared with which the writing of "Sybil" was no more difficult than falling off a log. Mrs. Williams Ellis has come as near to complete success as anybody but a very great novelist could expect to do, and has preserved withal a cleanness and a grave beauty of style which would have ensured the refusal of her book by—shall we be generous to Barabbas, and say 75 per cent. of the publishers in London?

## A Debaters' Encyclopædia.

Most serious students will agree that attendance at public debates is one of the worst methods of clearing up controverted questions. The reason is that whatever ideas are present (if any) quiver in the hot air of oratory and lose their outlines. If a magician-chairman could but trim the sharp facts and relevant reasoning, how much more could the listeners take home, and how very much earlier arrive home. (The present reviewer has been at debates where such a power of divination in a chairman would have enabled him to wind up the proceedings before they began.) One reform might be to institute "faculties" at Universities to train Chairmen of Public Debates—except for the probability that as and when anyone became expert at this job the public would probably prefer to hear him rather than the debaters. Something of this sort may happen in the future. In the meantime, people whose time is valuable had better attend debates by their own firesides. They can do this by buying a copy of Messrs. Routledge's latest edition of "Pros and Cons,"\* published a few months ago. It treats of about 175 political, social, religious, and other questions. The matter is set in two parallel columns, and each distinct argument under any subject heading is consecutively numbered and paired with its counter-argument in the opposite column. Because of the compression of statement necessary to cover the wide ground of ideas involved, the result is a work similar in nature to a minute-book, cutting the cacelle and tabulating the 'osses. It is a stereoscope with protruding and concave eyepieces focussed on an objective of essential debate. Mr. Cousens must be congratulated on the efficiency of his work, not only in regard to the rearrangements and restatements affecting the older controversies, but in his inclusion of newer ones, most of which, as would be expected, deal with financial subjects. Thus, in the Index, there are references to Banking, Capital Levy, Co-partnership, Credit, Currency, National Dividends, Finance, Gold Standard, League of Nations, Stabilisation of Prices, and Premium Bonus. Moreover, readers of THE NEW AGE will be interested to know that "Douglas Proposals" and "Social Credit" have their place in the list, and are ably dealt with. These financial subjects are not always discussed in isolation, but often in relation to older subjects. For instance, in the section "Nationalisation," it is nationalisation of banks which is treated: the earlier concept being discussed under "Collectivism" and elsewhere. There are many similar indications of Mr. Cousens's recognition of the new turn which credit research has given to the wheel of controversy. This is the very book for the newly enfranchised voter. It is a digest of all the issues in twenty past General Elections, and—unless some common-sense blows into Parliament—twenty future ones. At the same time it is a valuable book of reference for the serious student, while the writer will find stimulation in every page of it.

A. B.

\* "Pros and Cons": A Guide to the Leading Controversies of the Day. Seventh edition, re-written or revised by Hilderic Cousens, B.A. (Cantab.). 211 pp. 2s. 6d.

similarity and even identity of organisation, function, and policy of Jewry and finance as a result of this confusion. In "international finance" the word clearly connotes not merely a number of financiers scattered through the nations, but an organisation working through national banks by means of agreements, tacit or otherwise. In "international Jewry" it connotes nothing more than the fact that the Jews are scattered among the nations. There is no international organisation, that is, of course, outside the brains of believers in the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and there are no bodies which work on international agreements. In the one case the connotation is that of organisation, in the other that of distribution.

Few people will find it difficult to believe that superior intelligence could not and does not desire commercial and financial power without having to assume the urge of some mystic "kultur" teleology working through an appropriate organisation, and I, for one, am surprised that such an assumption is the standby of one who declares himself conversant with "all forms of Jewish thought."

S. P. ABRAMS.

#### "SCHOOLING."

Dear Sir,—I am naturally grateful to "R.M." for his extended criticism of my "Procrustes, or the Future of Education," though I should dispute the interpretation that he puts upon my argument as a whole. May I, however, call attention to a sentence or two in his second article, in which he seriously misrepresents my point of view? He speaks of me as "chiding the 'liberal education' idealists for their impractical belief that the pupil's personality and character can be developed by educational influences." In the passage to which he refers I was not denying that education influences character: I was merely trying to meet the "liberal education" idealists on their own ground. They are always loud in their insistence that the essential function of the teacher is to form character—and I agree with them. But the process of character-formation does not cease, as they seem to think, at the age of fourteen or even eighteen. It is therefore quite illogical of them to talk as though the environment (i.e., the job) that the pupil enters on leaving school is no concern of theirs.

Incidentally, I must disclaim any right to the doctorate that "R. M." gratuitously confers on me.

M. ALDERTON PINK.

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